A Response to N.T. Wright on Abortion

N.T. Wright, one of the world’s foremost biblical scholars, recently revealed that he believes abortion is permissible in the case of rape and may even be permissible when the “mental health” of the mother is threatened by the pregnancy. Now most opponents of abortion would acknowledge some exceptions. Even an adamantly pro-life organization such as the Christian Medical and Dental Associations (CMDA) suggests that abortion may be permissible in “the rare instance that the continuation of a pregnancy threatens a woman’s life.” Such an exception does not devalue unborn life; it merely recognizes that “two lives are at stake.” The exceptions Wright articulates, by contrast, presuppose an unacceptable differentiation in the moral value of human life. 

Men Have No Business to Meddle in Women’s Affairs?

Before explaining my concerns with Wright’s statements on abortion, I must first acknowledge that both Wright and I are men. Because neither of us can become pregnant, many would insist that we have no business opining on the morality of abortion. But consider the following passage from a 1921 periodical advocating eugenics:

The South American plains Indian women, living much on horseback, limited their families so as not to be hindered in travelling with their husbands. When a traveler reproached a woman of one of the South American Indian tribes for the practice of infanticide, … he received the retort, “Men have no business to meddle in women’s affairs.”

The author, who evidently agrees with this woman, cites her retort favorably. But if a man were to happen upon a woman in the act of killing her infant child, would he really have “no business” objecting? I trust that all of my readers, including the most ardently pro-choice, will recognize that such a man has not only the right but also the moral obligation to protest. "Men have no business to meddle in women’s affairs." When applied to infanticide, this argument carries no force for us. Why? Because we all recognize that infanticide is not merely an affair of women. The act also involves a child. 

It is precisely this same concern that is at the heart of the abortion debate. Pro-choice activists are fond of the slogan, “My body, my choice.” But if the abortion procedure only involved the woman’s body, then there would be no objection. The objection arises from the indisputable medical observation that the abortion procedure involves two bodies: the body of the woman and the body of the fetus. Consider the following excerpt from a medical textbook describing how to perform a surgical abortion: 

The procedure changes significantly at 21 weeks because the fetal tissues become much more cohesive and difficult to dismember. This problem is accentuated by the fact that the fetal pelvis may be as much as 5cm in width. The calvaria [skull] is no longer the principal problem; it can be collapsed. Other structures, such as the pelvis, present more difficulty. … A long curved Mayo scissors may be necessary to decapitate and dismember the fetus.

It is not the woman that the physician is attempting to “decapitate and dismember.” There is obviously another body involved in this procedure.  

Because abortion involves two bodies, the procedure poses a profound moral dilemma that must be confronted by all responsible citizens, whether male or female. It is thus perfectly appropriate for Wright to enter this discussion. Unfortunately, however, his contribution is ultimately unhelpful. 

The Sooner the Better? 

In his comments on abortion, Wright gives particular attention to the circumstance of rape. Wright explains,

In cases of rape or in cases of incest there may be a very, very strong argument for saying, this ought never to have happened, and with sorrow - because we do not want to do this in principle - but with sorrow and a bit of shame, the best thing to do is, as soon as possible, to terminate this pregnancy.

He goes on to say, 

In principle this [i.e., abortion] is not something which we should welcome; it is not something which we should collude with. At the same time, there may be certain exceptions, of which severe deformity might be one, of which certainly incest and rape would be others. And in those cases I would say, the sooner the better, because at a certain point - and I am not medically qualified to say at what point I would draw a line - then this is a viable human being that should then be cherished.

Now I am confident Wright would deny that the circumstance of rape justifies infanticide. I suspect Wright would even deny that the circumstance of rape justifies the grisly late-term procedure described above. Why then does Wright believe that the circumstance of rape justifies an early abortion? Evidently, Wright does not believe that the intentional destruction of a human embryo is morally equivalent to the intentional destruction of a human at some later stage of development. Indeed, Wright is quite explicit on this point: “the sooner the better.” In other words, the earlier in the pregnancy the abortion is performed, the better. 

Now Wright would of course never claim that it is “better” to kill a two-year-old than an eighteen-year-old. Wright understands that a toddler has the same intrinsic moral value and right to life as an adult. But Wright evidently does not believe that this equality extends back before birth to conception. For Wright, intentionally destroying a human infant is much worse than intentionally destroying a human embryo. This is why Wright believes that certain considerations might justify destroying an embryo that would never be sufficient to justify destroying an infant, even if the infant was euthanized painlessly.  

Of course, such a view is understandable. I am sure that many of my readers will find it intuitively obvious that euthanizing an infant is much worse than destroying an embryo. But when it comes to the value of human life, intuition is a dangerous guide. To the modern Westerner, it is obvious that a newborn infant has the same right to life as a fully developed adult. To the modern Westerner, it is obvious that a girl with Down syndrome has the same right to life as a Nobel laureate. To the modern Westerner, it is obvious that a homeless drug addict has the same right to life as an Oxford professor. However, as Wright well knows, the ancient Greeks and Romans would not have found such views to be obvious. If ancient intuitions about human inequality were so desperately mistaken, how can we be confident that our own intuitions on the matter are infallible? 

Moreover, the view articulated by Wright is inescapably arbitrary. At the moment the sperm fertilizes the egg, a unique member of the species comes into existence. This is a simple fact of biology. After conception, the developing human passes innumerable milestones, including first heartbeat, first brainwave, first laugh, and first step. Wright’s vague dictum, “the sooner the better,” is a tacit concession that it would be hopelessly arbitrary to identify any of these milestones as the point at which the developing human acquires the right to life. 

The traditional Christian view is well articulated by Vatican II: “From the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes.” This maximally inclusive view is superior to the view articulated by Wright. Vatican II declines to withhold human rights from any member of the species. Vatican II refuses to exclude any human from the human family. Vatican II recognizes that life is to be cherished at all stages of development. 

In conclusion, I recognize that Wright is driven to his position on abortion by genuine concern for the mother. However, while victims of rape certainly deserve our compassion, a mother in the tragic circumstances Wright envisions would be better served by Christian leaders who refuse the spirit of the age and insist that violence is not the answer.

Murray Vasser is Assistant Professor of New Testament Studies at Wesley Biblical Seminary.